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The Universal and the Particular in Legal
Discourse*
George P. Fletcher**
My target in this article is a set of views that I shall call the
functionalist perspective of comparative law. Of course, the word
"functionalist" stands for a number of different theories. In order to be precise about the view that I oppose, I shall set my
sights on the arguments developed in Otto Kahn-Freund's inaugural lecture Comparative Law as an Academic Subject,' published two decades ago.
Kahn-Freund's argument is that because developed legal
systems tend toward the same substantive solution to particular
problems, the concepts and forms in which these solutions are
expressed are of little importance in the comparative study of
law. What counts for the purpose of comparison is the fact of a
solution and not the ideas, concepts, or legal arguments that
support the solution. If on a given set of facts the victim of an
accident in a friend's apartment can recover damages from the
landlord, the fact of recovery overwhelms, in significance, the rationale for the decision. As compared with the hard fact of
wealth transferring from one party to the other, the ideas and
arguments explaining the flow are of little significance. The rationale could lie in tort; it could rest on an implied warranty of
habitability; it could rest on an interpretation of the actual lease
between the owner and the tenant. None of this, Kahn-Freund
argues, is of great interest to the comparative legal scholar. The
important point, reminiscent of Holmes, is that "the social need
demands satisfaction." '2 As Kahm-Freund put it, "[t]he satisfaction of the felt needs of society through the law is, in my sub* This article is based on a speech by Professor Fletcher at the Brigham Young
University Law School International and Comparative Law Symposium on October 19,
1986.
** Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1. Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject, 82 LAW Q. REV. 40
(1966).
2. Id. at 51.
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mission, the cardinal subject of all academic legal studies."3 Apparently, it is a matter of contingent form only whether this
satisfaction is expressed in one doctrinal medium or in another.
True, Kahn-Freund reserves a place in comparative law as
an academic subject for the study of divergent strategies for satisfying these felt social needs. The range of his interest in this
regard includes such questions as whether a particular society
seeks to protect shareholders in infant companies against their
fraudulent promoters by providing an ex post damage remedy or
by instituting an ex ante regulatory system. But the emphasis
should always be "not [on] that which is formulated and said
but [on] that which is being done." 4
He thought it admirable that the English, as contrasted
with his German colleagues, regarded doctrinal forms as but "in'5
tellectual tools to be used and, if necessary, to be cast aside."
Thus, the functionalist perspective includes some concern for
the machinery by which a legal system seeks to satisfy social
needs-but the notion of machinery must be understood narrowly. This perspective includes the institutions that occupy
lawyers, but not the ideas, concepts, arguments and doctrinal
forms by which lawyers make sense of what they are doing and
with which they seek to persuade officials and each other of the
justice of their cause.
The functionalist perspective carries forward the teachings
of Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn and other skeptics called legal
realists. If doctrinal forms verge on fetishistic thinking, if they
are nothing but the "pretty playthings '7 of lawyers, then surely
they could not be the object of fruitful academic study. These
skeptics were realists about only one thing: the reality of power
in the legal system. What attracted them, and what attracts
Kahn-Freund, is the use of official power to alter peoples' lives.
Whether this use of power is domesticated in legal forms and
perceived as an expression of justice apparently matters less
than the salient fact that governments acting through legal systems respond to the "felt necessities of the time."8
The functionalist perspective has generated numerous
3. Id.
4. Id. at 54.

5. Id.
6. See J. FRANK,

LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 273-74 (1970).
7. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 14 (1960).
8. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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worthwhile studies in comparative law. The work that stands
out from other American efforts is Rudolph Schlesinger's multivolume study of contracts across legal systems. His method of
research stresses the judicial response of various legal systems to
particular sets of facts.9 The theory of contract and its doctrinal
basis is of the lower rank of importance.
A little sophistication about legal argument yields the view
that the study of doctrinal forms is important only as a means of
debunking and demystifying the use of raw political power. For
every doctrine, there is an equally powerful anti-doctrine; for
every thrust, as Llewellyn put it, an equally powerful parry. 0 If
fault is important, so are the values underlying strict liability; if
consideration is a necessary channeling device, so too we cannot
ignore the justice of protecting reasonable reliance. If lawyers
ever worshiped the law as a set of controlling algorithms, this
vision was for the realist-skeptics, the God that failed.
Following the spirit of Holmes and Llewellyn, Kahn-Freund
would probably dissent from the pejorative term "raw" as a
description of the political power used behind doctrinal forms.
These skeptics embraced the use of power for good purposes. As
Ackerman has argued, systematic skepticism about traditional
legal categories cleared the ground for the New Deal and the
acceptance of an activist, interventionist legal system.1 When
the law functions as "social engineering," the political power
that it expresses is not raw power; it is hardly power at all. More
antiseptic than coercion, it is a lever of change that harms no
one, that has no harmful side effects, that generates no plausible
dissent.
From our current perspective, the notion that a legal system
can simply respond to social problems and "solve" them represents an extraordinary form of political naivete. Looking back on
the era before Vietnam, before the Burger and Rehnquist courts,
before the religious revival, the right to life movement, and the
dismantling of welfare programs, one can only be amazed at the
childlike innocence of those who regarded the law as a politically2
neutral device for the "satisfaction of the felt needs of society.'
Given our understanding today of the moral and political
fissures in all Western societies, we can no longer talk about "so9. 1 R.

SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS 32 (1968).
10. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 67-68.
11. B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 17-19 (1984).
12. See Kaln-Freund, supra note 1, at 51.
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ciety" as a single organic entity that has definable needs. We
consist of numerous societies rent along intersecting axes of
philosophical, class, religious, and political commitments. There
is no way to satisfy the needs of the religious or the secular without alienating the other. There is no economically neutral way of
promoting the ecological views of the established middle class
without frustrating the aspirations of the rising lower middle
class. Within the confines of legal theory, there is no way of promoting the utilitarian views of the economists without incurring
the criticism of those committed to individual rights. As the
planning of a subway requires a satisfactory environmental impact statement, the assertion of any legal solution should also
require analysis of the resulting impact on those who suffer by
the supposed solution. There is no longer a neutral goal of policy, but only conflicting policies and no shared standard for
choosing among them.
The view that I wish to develop in this article differs from
the naive politics expressed in the literature of the realists and
the comparative functionalists. It differs as well from the total
critique and the total commitment to politics that moves the followers of Roberto Unger"3 and Duncan Kennedy. There is nothing to fear in the claim that law is politics. "So what!" is the
appropriate reply. There are many ways of doing politics. Primitive forms of coercion and manipulation give way, in a legal system, to argument and the effort of lawyers to persuade each
other on a restricted range of debatable issues.
The intellectual conceit of demystifying the law ignores the
difference between the politics of coercion and the politics of
principled persuasion. When the "real" consists not in discourse,
but in action, we distort the reality of our own experience. We
toss aside as unimportant those constructs and concepts through
which we perceive and seek to develop principled solutions. The
assumption is that talk, legal talk, cannot by itself control the
actions of officials. Any belief that holds talk as important is
scorned as conceptualism or formalism.
It is undeniable that deploying power is a critical feature of
the law's unfolding, but it is not the only feature. From Jewish
law as expressed in the Talmud, to Roman law, to the schools of
jurisprudence that developed in Italy, France and Germany, to
13. On the "total critique" of liberalism, see R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 1-3
(1975).
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the common law from Coke to the bicentennial of the American
Constitution, the moving force of the law has not been the writ
but the brief, not the seizure of body and property but the effort
to persuade. Skeptics make the mistake of assuming that if the
sources of law do not determine or even direct the outcome of
disputes, these sources must be irrelevant. The significance of
statutes, cases and theoretical doctrines is not that they dictate
the uses of power, but rather that they circumscribe the field of
debate. They provide the starting points for argument among
those who have domesticated their urge for power in shared assumptions about justice and the rightful structure of social
cooperation.
Negotiation on legal issues, legal argument and judicial
opinions define an ongoing discourse of legal criticism and justification. This discourse is constrained by a set of assumptions
both about what constitutes a good argument and about what, in
principle, is irrelevant. The conventional sources of law-be they
statutory material, case law or scholarly theories-provide the
foundations of good arguments. The quality of these arguments
depends, of course, on a whole set of implicit interpretative principles that constitute the craft of lawyerly rhetoric. Lawyers
learn as well that certain appeals-such as those to mercy, love,
the will of God, the beauty of Keats and a host of others too
numerous to conjure up-simply do not belong in the discourse
either of negotiation or of formal argument.
This discourse lies at the core of the lawyerly experience. It
is more basic, in my view of the law, than the availability of
sanctions to enforce judicial judgments. I can imagine legal discourse that does not generate enforceable judgments. In systems
without judicial review, such as the Soviet Union, the applicable
constitution generates this kind of lawyerly exchange. Unenforceable legal claims still shape the discourse of international
relations. I cannot, in contrast, imagine an official use of power
that we would call law if official decisions were not informed by
arguments reflecting the interests and alleged rights of the affected parties.
The first proposition I wish to maintain, then, is that the t
life of the law is closely linked to a species of disciplined discourse that we call legal argument. This proposition stands opposed to the functionalist perspective, for if we focus on legal
argument we are invariably led to serious reflection about the
forms of the argument. It makes a difference whether the case
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for a particular result is cast in the language of tort or of contract, whether it bespeaks the language of utility or of rights,
whether it invokes precise rules enacted by some governmental
body, or whether it rests on unenacted commonly-accepted principles of law. This view stands Kahn-Freund's position roughly
on its head: What counts is not only what is done, but "that
which is formulated and said."' 4
The conclusion that law is primarily discourse encapsulates
the movement and development of two decades of jurisprudential thinking. It takes its lead from H.L.A. Hart's innovative suggestion that in seeking an account of legal experience, we consider the internal as well as the external point of view. 15 The
latter external perspective leads to the preoccupation with sanctioning and dovetails well with functionalist theories of law. The
internal point of view requires that we focus on the way in which
participants in the legal system invoke the materials of the law
to justify their behavior and to criticize others. This is but the
first step toward a full consideration of the matrix of legal
argument.
Dworkin's work carries the internal perspective further-initially, by turning our attention to the relevance of legal
principles and other factors that ought to bear on legal decisionmaking,' -6 and in his most recent work by stressing the problem
of interpretation as the center of legal argument and justification. 7 My argument extrapolates from the trend toward the internal point of view: The neglected heartland of the law is the
linguistic interaction by which we explain to ourselves and to
others why the state should intervene on behalf of one party in a
dispute.
Thinking of law as a system of discourse requires more,
rather than less, attention to the medium in which we express
our arguments. The nexus between language and legal culture is
far stronger than we ordinarily assume in teaching and writing
about comparative law. If we compare the strength of French
legal thinking in Quebec and its progressive demise in Louisiana,
there is no doubt that the bedrock of language explains the difference. Legal cultures are embedded, more than we realize, in
particular languages. This is most evident in the theoretical
14. Kahn-Freund, supra note 1, at 54.

15. H. HART,

THE CONCEPT OF LAW

97-120 (1961).

16. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 14, 22-29 (1967).
17. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 410-11 (1986).
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treatises that one finds in multilingual jurisdictions. There is
only one South African criminal law, but you get an entirely different view of what that law is if you read an Afrikaner text
inspired by German sources and an English text relying on common law methodology. There is only one Swiss criminal law, but
that single law is refracted differently under the looking glasses
of French and German writers. Discussing law in a particular
language commits the speaker to a set of concepts and expressions that affect not only the form but the substance of legal
argument.
Now I must admit that there are aspects of this connection
that I do not completely comprehend. Language shapes cultural
identity and part of that identity seems to be an indigenous
style of legal argument and legal theory. Of course, as an act of
choice, a developing legal culture can choose to identify with one
of the traditional cultures and transplant its conceptual terminology and theoretical orientation to a new language. We witness
this phenomenon in the attachment of Japanese scholars to the
German conceptual style; and of Israelis to the pragmatism and
anti-theoretical bent of the English common law. This phenomenon is much easier to document than to explain, and at this
stage of my thinking, I can, at most, describe what I take to be
the close connection between language, on the one hand, and legal argument and legal theory, on the other. •
Bringing the significance of language into focus-returning
to the text, as it were-changes our perception of the universal
and the particular in legal thought. For Kahn-Freund, the universal consisted in the convergence of Western legal systems on
the same solution to the same social problem. If we keep in mind
the internal point of view, however, the critical importance of
language and rhetoric undermines this perception of universality. We must attend more to the particularities of the concepts
and arguments we use both to perceive problems and to propose
solutions.
Many of the basic terms of legal discourse are truly universal. The legal systems of the industrialized world share the discourse of rights, duties, contract, property, breach, fault, causation and responsibility. These terms readily translate from one
system of discourse into another. Further, all systems of private
and criminal law comprehend the basic distinction between corrective and distributive justice. They base liability on transac-
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tions that raise questions of corrective justice rather than on assessments of the actor's background and personality.
For all this similarity in basic structure, there are differences in detail that are so profound they call into question the
extent of a shared foundation of legal thought. I want to discuss
some of these details, which have happened to come to my attention, and then reflect on the deeper significance of this crosssection of particularities.
The place to begin, I would suggest, is with obvious
problems of translation. Take the basic standard of negligence,
used in one fashion or another as a standard for responsibility in
torts and criminal law all over the world. Whenever we in the
common law think about negligence, our minds turn to the notions of reasonable care or, in the full standard definition, to the
notion of care that a reasonable person would exercise under the
circumstances. The German civil code relies on the equally lapidary formula: die im Verkehr erforderliche Sorgfalt [the degree
of attentiveness required or necessary in the transaction]. 8 In
most and perhaps in all cases, these two formulae-the common
law and the German-have the same pragmatic impact on litigation. I have no way of knowing whether someone regarded as
non-negligent in one system would be treated as negligent in the
other. That, of course, is the question that would occupy the
functionalist in his comparison of the two systems. Even if we
could not establish a distinction in practice, it would be a mistake to treat these verbal approximations of negligence as
equivalent or interchangeable. These words, recited ritualistically in English and in German, testify to significant differences
in legal culture. Let us take a closer look at the words used in
these respective formulae for negligence.
Americans rely in this context, as well as in innumerable
others, on the notion of reasonableness; Germans invoke the
standard of necessity to get at the same point. This is a significant difference, for the term "reasonableness" more clearly signals the process of evaluation, particularly the process of trading
off the costs and benefits of taking risks. This process of evaluation remains concealed under the supposed objectivity of "necessary attentiveness."
At an even more basic level, the American reliance on the
word "care" invites the kind of debate we witnessed several gen18. Btirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] § 276.
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erations ago about whether negligence is a standard for assessing
risks or a standard for assessing attentiveness to creating risks.' 9
We now use the term to refer to both. The standard of "reasonable care" directs our attention first to the question of whether
the risk created is justified or reasonable in light of its possible
benefits; and second, to the subjective posture of the actor relative to the externalized risk.2 0 The German term Sorgfalt directs
our attention more to the subjective side of negligence.
The multilayered meaning of "reasonable care" has proved
to be significant in the evolution of American legal thought. The
critical turn came in the use of cost/benefit analysis in assessing
negligence. Generations of law students absorbed this way of
thinking from the Learned Hand formula first articulated in
1947.21 The economists seized upon this practice and used it as
the beachhead for their effort to reduce as much legal thinking
as possible to economic modalities. The German
formula-rooted as it is to the subjective side of negligence-resists economic reinterpretation. In the German sources
I have checked,2 2 one does not even find the principle of balancing interests, or assessing costs and benefits, as the appropriate
approach to assessing negligence.23
Even the difference between the American word "circumstances" and the German reliance on Verkehr carries significance. Circumstances are protean. They bear upon the assessment of the risk in context as well as on gauging the personal
responsibility of the actor for not apprehending the risk. The
notion of Verkehr, more limitedly, applies to the transaction and
thus excludes, so far as I can tell, personal features of the actor
that might excuse his not perceiving and appreciating the risk
implicit in his conduct.
Whatever its implications, the definition of negligence as
19. See Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1927).
20. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
21. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
22. II J. VON STAUDINGERS, KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 276 (M.
Lowisch 12th ed. 1979); 0. PALANDT, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 276 (P. Bassenge 39th
ed. 1980).
23. This is not to say that the notion of balancing interests in unknown in contemporary theory. See SCHONKE-SCHRODER-LENCKNER, STRAFGETZBUCH KOMMENTAR § 34
(1985) (Balancing interests as the standard for necessity as a justification). The balancing of interests also enters into the judgment in private law whether the risk taken is
wrongful (contrary to the Right). See the path-breaking precedent in Bundesgerichtshof
in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] §§ 21, 24.
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the failure to heed die im Verkehr erforderliche Sorgfalt is engraved in the mind of every German lawyer. It is as much a part
of his catechism as is the liturgy of reasonable care in the church
of the common law.24 His way of speaking minimizes a German
lawyers' receptivity to cost/benefit approaches to negligence and
it also disinclines him to use standard hypothetical figures in
elaborating the concept of necessary care. The standard of reasonable care lends itself to identification with the conduct of a
reasonable person. But the notion of "necessary attentiveness"
does not link up with any readily definable hypothetical actor.
There is no standard of the attentive person or of anyone else
who knows what is necessary in the particular transaction.
Ways of speaking do not determine ways of thinking. I am
not subscribing here to the Whorf hypothesis that thought follows syntax 5 or to the less sophisticated argument that the
available vocabulary circumscribes the possible range of
thought.26 Yet ways of speaking do incline us toward particular
associations; words-particularly words that are repeated over
and over again-invoke the culture of which they are a part. In
referring to these definitions of negligence as liturgical, I am
completely serious. Lawyers ritualistically repeat these and
other standard definitions and thereby invest the phrases with
special meaning. The use of this ritualized language creates a
mood in which the lawyerly mind may address the facts and
classify them as within or without the ambit of negligence. The
liturgy of definition brings into focus other occurrences of the
same problem and concentrates this accumulated experience on
the problem at hand.
There is no place that we rely more heavily on the liturgical
value of language than in our Constitution. We cherish the particular language of the Constitution so much that when we
amend the basic document we leave the original language intact
24. There is an additional reason why German lawyers are attached to the formula
laid down in BGB § 276. The word Verkehr also means "intercourse", including that of
the sexual variety. When German students first read BGB § 276, they must smile at the
pun: negligence is defined as "the failure to exercise the attentiveness required in sexual
intercourse."
25. See generally LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY. SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJALEE WHORF (J. Carroll ed. 1956). For a succinct summary and critique of Whorf's
views, see Black, Linguistic Relativity: The Views of Benjamin Lee Whorf, 68 PHIL. L.
MIN

REV. 228 (1959).
26. For earlier discussions of this issue, see Fletcher, The Presumption of Innocence

in the Soviet Union, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1203 (1968).
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and add the amendment as a supplement. Even when an amendment is repealed, as was the case with the eighteenth, we publish
it thereafter as a part of our constitutional history never to be
forgotten.
Particular crystallizations of words prevail not only in the
Constitutional text, but in the doctrinal theory that we use to
explain the Constitution to ourselves. These features of constitutional theory came to my attention recently as I was examining a
new Soviet text on the American Constitution.2" Some provisions such as the first amendment lend themselves to direct
translation into Russian. Others, such as the fourth amendment,
pose problems of translation that enable us to distinguish the
universal from the particular in our legal culture. The universals
can be captured in other legal languages; the particulars of our
tradition are bound, far more than we realize, to the English
language.
The notions of search and seizure translate readily into
Russian as well as into other civilian legal languages. The problematic word in the fourth amendment proves to be the term
that lies at the core of our legal culture: "unreasonable" searches
and seizures violate the constitution. 8 The Russian translators,
whom I have every reason to believe are sophisticated in their
sense of language, rendered the notion of unreasonableness as
the equivalent of "unfounded. 2 9 Why should they have done
that? They have a word nerazumnyj that precisely translates
the English word "unreasonable." It derives from the root meaning "reason." In ordinary discourse, nerazumnyj means roughly
the same thing as "unreasonable." Yet the translator balked at
rendering our legal notion of "unreasonableness" with the seeming equivalent in ordinary Russian. Obviously, there are
problems in translating legal language as subtle as those that
distort poetry as it passes from one language to another. The
word "unreasonable" (nerazumnyj) will not do in legal Russian
because it does not have the same liturgical value as a word like
"unfounded" (neobosnovonnyj) that readily comes to the lips of
lawyers.
27. A. MISHIN & V. VLASIKHIN, KONSTITUTsIYA SSHA: POLITKO-PRAvOVOY KoM[The Constitution of the USA: A Political-Legal Commentary] (1985).
28. For further reflections on the centrality of "reasonableness" in our legal thinking, see Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARv. L. REV. 949 (1985).
MENTARIY

29. A.

MISHIN

neobosnovannyj).

& V.

VLASIKHIN,

supra note 27, at 209 (the Russian word is
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Of course, there is a radical difference between the question
whether a search is unreasonable and whether it is unfounded or
ungrounded. The American term gives vent to our tendency to
regard all legal questions not as absolutes, but as invitations to
balancing competing interests. That particular sense of reasonable equilibrium is lost in asking the question whether the search
is well founded. The ambiguous relationship between the first
and second clauses of the fourth amendment-between the standard of reasonableness and the warrant requirement-is lost on
the Russian ear. Indeed, the authors of this commentary on the
Constitution, who generally understand the dynamics of American law, failed to grasp this ambiguity as it has unfolded in the
case law. They explain the notion of a "well founded search" as
equivalent to a "lawful search" 0 and then treat the warrant
clause as further elaboration of what it means for a search to be
lawful. 31 They missed the line of cases treating the warrant
clause as but one of many ways in which a search might qualify
as reasonable. This leads them to the position that permissible
searches without warrants, such as automobile searches, testify
to politically motivated circumventions of the fourth amendment.32 Perhaps this misreading is driven by the pleasures of political self-righteousness. But perhaps it is simply a consequence
of not understanding the latent ambiguity between the first and
second clauses of the fourth amendment.
If the term "reasonable" gets lost in translation, imagine
what happens to "probable cause"-the standard of evidence required for the issuance of a warrant. There is no way to capture
this term of art in Russian or in any other European language.
The Soviet translators render this elusive standard as "sufficient
foundation,"33 which is very similar to the term that the RSFSR
Code of Criminal Procedure uses as a standard for opening a
preliminary investigation and classifying a suspect as an accused. 4 Because this stage in Soviet procedure is equivalent to
30. Id, at 210. The choice of words here is illuminating. The Soviet writers gravitate
to the word pravomernjy or "in accordance with the Right" in order to account ultimately for the constitutional concept of "reasonableness." This illustrates my general
thesis on the parallel functions of "reasonableness" in the common law and the notion of
the "Right" in civilian systems. See Fletcher, supra note 28.
31. A. MISHIN & V. VLASIKHIN, supra note 27, at 210-11.
32. Id. at 216-17.

33. Id. at 209 (dostatochnoyoe osnovanie).
34. UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUALNII
nal Procedure).

KODEKS

RSFSR [UPK RSFSR] § 143 (Code of Crimi-
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our issuing an indictment and because we use "probable cause"
as the standard for issuing indictments as well as warrants, it
makes good sense to translate "probable cause" by the term that
Soviet lawyers would use in the equivalent legal context.
Yet the term "sufficient foundation" seems to convey much
less information than does our beloved standard "probable
cause." American lawyers actually think of probable cause as a
discernible standard of evidence. It belongs in the spectrum of
standards including "preponderance of the evidence" and that
standard that seems to everyone to require more, "clear and
convincing evidence." It would be difficult for us to accept the
idea that these supposedly objective standards of evidence are
all chimerical. Yet if it were not for our ritualistically invoking
the standard of probable cause as though it were coherent and
discernible, our curious expression-which has nothing to do either with probability or with causation-would seem as vacuous
as the Soviet standard of "sufficient foundation."
Fourth amendment jurisprudence brings to bear at least two
central concepts that do not lend themselves to precise translation into Russian. Katz v. United Statess5 brings into relief conflicting views about the nature of searching another's premises.
According to the traditional way of thinking, there was no search
without a trespass. According to the modern approach, the issue
is not whether the intruder physically enters a protected zone,
but whether his efforts to snoop violate reasonable 6 expectations of privacy. The problem is captured nicely in the issue
posed in Katz: A bugging device attached to the outside wall of
a telephone booth does not constitute an intrusion, but it might
well violate the speaker's reasonable expectations of a private
telephone conversation. Does it constitute a search that might
be unconstitutional under the fourth amendment? Katz, as we
know, seemingly expanded the scope of the fourth amendment
to include non-trespassory invasions of privacy.
My concern here is with the expressions "trespass" and
"privacy." Both are among the richest expressions of the English
language. The former is rooted in the earliest manifestations of
35. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36. Note the significance again of "reasonableness" in formulating the modern theory of protectible autonomy. The term here obviously requires more than what one
would ordinarily expect under the circumstances; for if that were the standard, those
generally denied privacy would have a lesser claim than those who enjoy higher
expectations.
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legal thought in, for example, the writs of trespass and trespass
on the case. The latter is one of the fecund figures to come upon
the legal stage in this century. Not only has privacy emerged as
a new tort and the central value in the fourth amendment, it has
become a constitutional rubric in its own right and serves as the
verbal marker separating protected procreational and sexual
freedom from the legitimate regulatory sphere of the states.
What intrigues me is that neither of these basic terms in
American legal thought, neither the notion of trespass nor that
of privacy, has a counterpart in Russian. In order to capture the
idea of trespass, the Soviet translators must resort to the circumlocution "violate possession. 3' 7 It is difficult to know
whether this insipid formula captures the special charge loaded
into the notion of trespass. Would a Russian-speaking judge
classify the slightest physical intrusion as a violation of possession, as common law judges are quick to see a trespass?
Whatever particular speakers of Russian might say in response
to a questionnaire, it is clear that the absence of an analogue to
trespass gives them a different orientation to the problem. In
thinking about whether a spike microphone or an influx of light
rays constitutes the violation of possession, they are not likely to
have the sense that some very fundamental tradition of affirming and protecting boundaries is at stake.
When it comes to the concept of privacy, the gap between
English and Russian speakers is even greater than in the contexts already discussed. In order to talk about privacy as the
foundation of the fourth amendment, the Soviet translators
must transliterate "privacy" as prajvesi and use it without
translation. "Ah! I knew it," we are quick to respond; "That is
because there is no privacy in the Soviet Union." I am afraid the
matter is not so simple. The Russian language has the panoply
of terms necessary to talk about freedom and human dignity,
but the concept of privacy remains a gap. The issue is not political. It is deeper than transient patterns of surveillance and repression. The problem lies in the very language used to talk
about politics. The only way Soviet lawyers and citizens can talk
about privacy-whether they have it or not-is to use the English word. This is true not only of Russian speaking people in
the Soviet Union, but of emigres to the United States who adhere to their native language.
37. A.

MISHIN

& V. VLASIKHIN, supra note 27, at 210 (narushat'valdenie).

335]

LEGAL DISCOURSE

I have referred to four problems of translations from English to Russian, four concepts that signal particularities of the
English legal language. It is worth reflecting again on these four
terms and considering the differences among them. "Reasonableness" is different from the other three terms, for its counterpart in Russian is used widely in daily speech. The Russian term
does not carry the same legal liturgical force, and therefore lawyers resist using it. Significantly, what is true in this regard
about the Russian language and Soviet law applies as well to
German, French and indeed, so far as I know, to all the continental European languages. I would not assert that the term
"reasonableness" could not acquire the force in these languages
that it has in English legal discourse. As a matter of practice,
however, English distinguished itself as the language that has
made reasonableness a legal term of art.
"Probable cause" resists translation both into daily speech
and the legal language. The translation into other European languages would resemble the Russian phrase "sufficient foundation." The reason for this concurrence in the civil law languages
is that they share a rejection of the system of legal proofs and its
tendency, expressed in the notion of probable cause, to think of
evidence in objective, quantitative terms. Evidence for civilians
is important so far as it bears on the formation of an intimate
conviction of truth. As they have a hard time translating our
reified conceptions of evidence, we have difficulty rendering in
English what they mean by a subjective "intimate conviction" in
response to the evidence.
"Trespass" differs from these other terms as a venerable institution of common law thinking. It is surprising that there is
no analogous term in Russian or, so far as I know, in other European languages. The most one can do is partially to capture the
meaning of the term as "violating" or, as the Germans say,
'
"breaking possession. "3
The treatment of "privacy" is distinctive, for, as we have
seen, the term is not translated at all into Russian. It is simply
borrowed bodily into Russian as it is into Japanese. 9 French
38. The term Gewahrsamsbruchhas some of the richness of the English term and it
plays a similar role in infusing the law of theft with the symbolism of crossing a forbidden boundary. See Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HAV. L. REv. 469
(1976).
39. My Japanese colleague, Professor Kato, informs me that both the term "privacy"-used as a borrowing from English-and the European term "right to personality"
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and German lawyers rely on an analogue to the term privacy
based on the notion of "personality." Called the general right of
personality in these languages, this concept has had a history
parallel to the emergence of privacy in common law jurisdictions. The major codifications are silent on the general right to
personality. The concept developed later after the codes were in
place. In German as in American law, the concept plays a central
role both in constitutional theory and in the development of tort
law. And again in both jurisdictions, the moving force in the development and refinement of the new right has been the discovery of a general principle underlying long-recognized instances
of protection, such as securing the use of one's name or picture
against unwanted exploitation in advertising. The general right
of personality has a reach different from that of privacy, for it
lacks the image of spatial separateness suggested by the notion
of privacy. One can invoke the German right of personality to
explain why entrapment or surreptitious tape recordings should
be impermissible, but the notion of personality lends itself less
well to explaining the sanctity of one's home. The right of personality is more a right to flourish as a person than it is a right,
as Brandeis and Warren said, "to be let alone.""'
I am advocating an approach to comparative law that takes
these linguistic particularities as the starting point for an analysis of our divergent legal cultures. There are differences among
the legal systems of the industrial world which are greater than
they appear to the functionalist eye. There is little to be gained
by ignoring the richness of legal languages. There is admittedly
some confirmation in realizing that certain trends cut across
doctrinal and political systems. If everyone is inclined to protect
tort plaintiffs, or impose pollution controls, we are inclined to
believe that we are all doing the right thing. But this functional
resemblance, I would argue, remains superficial unless we know
the doctrinal depths from which the instances of convergence
emanate. The only way to plumb these depths is to recognize
linguistic divergence as clues to deeper disagreements of instinct
and inclination in reasoning about legal problems.
The implications of this approach for teaching comparative
law are far-reaching. We should not make a fetish of the linguisare used in contemporary Japanese law. This leads to difficult and intriguing problems of
deciding what the respective boundaries of the two concepts should be.
40. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890)
(quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
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tic particularities of French, German, Russian, Japanese and the
other languages that figure prominently in our comparative
teaching. But neither should we be quick, as are the casebooks
in use now, to treat foreign concepts as readily translatable into
English. The problem of translation should be of highest priority '
in every course that relies on comparative analysis as a method
for expanding our consciousness of the possible in legal thought.
The stress on language raises some philosophical problems
of its own. Stressing the liturgical use of language does not account for the way in which this ritualized reliance on stock
phrases actually issues in legal decisions. My operating hypothesis, confirmed in part by the attachment of lawyers to their definitions, is that liturgy leads to a special kind of focus on the
problem at hand. There is more to be done, however, in generating a phenomenological account of the way in which language
and argument generates this focus and limits the range of possible decisions.
If the ritualized use of language has a place in the law, it
has no role in comparative law as an academic subject. Repeating a theory until it becomes a slogan hardly substitutes for reasoned argument. What we can hope for in the theory of comparative law is fewer methodological slogans and more reasoned
debate about what we learn from mastering the details of another legal system.

